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1. INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidence suggests that OMFBs predominate across the 
corporate landscape. (Shanker and Astrachan, 2003). Indeed, fami-
lies are present in one third of the S&P 500 and hold nearly 18 per-
cent of firms’ equity stake (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). In the UK, 
the family business sector is estimated to represent 75% of all en-
terprises, including about 10% of quoted firms (Poutziouris, 2006; 
Capital Economics 2008). 
In 2009, the European Commission, following deliberations of the 
family business expert group, published report outlining the key is-
sues pertinent to the long-term development of the family business 
economy. More specifically, amongst others, the experts argued for 
family enterprise tailored  schemes in order to  channel better finan-
ce in order to help OMFBs unleash their growth potential and safe-
guard their sustainability across generations.  
Panikkos Zata-
Poutziouris1
Visiting Associate Professor, 
Family Business Initiatives
Centre for Enterprise, 
Manchester Business 
School, UK
and Associate Professor 
Entrepreneurship and 
Family Business 
CIIM Business School, 
Cyprus 

poutziouris@ciim.ac.cyUNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | CUARTO TRImESTRE 2011 | ISSN: 1698-5117
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper offers a brief review of theoretical and empirical trends of the financial affairs  of  
owner–managed family businesses [OMFBs] across their business life cycle – from closely held 
private SMEs to open quoted corporations. Comparative analysis of the financial structure and 
performance of family controlled firms versus the experience of their peers, establishes that  
OMFBs  adhere fiercely to the principles of the pecking order theory – they prefer to finance 
their development in a hierarchical fashion using internal funds followed by external financing. In 
conclusion, some tentative policy implications from the perspective of owner/managers, service 
providers (financiers and advisors) and policy makers, are discussed. 
RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO
El artículo ofrece una revisión de la investigaciones teóricas y empíricas en materia de 
finanzas de empresas familiares gestionadas por el propietario (OMFBs), a lo largo del ciclo 
de vida de la empresa, desde las PYMEs no cotizadas hasta las empresas cotizadas. Un 
análisis comparativo de la estructura financiera y rentabilidad de las empresas familiares 
versus las no familiares establece que las empresas familiares gestionadas por el propietario 
cumplen fielmente la teoría de jerarquización financiera, prefiriendo financiar su desarrollo 
de forma jerárquica utilizando fondos propios seguidos de financiación externa. A modo de 
conclusión, el artículo recoge algunas posibles implicaciones del trabajo para los dueños/
gestores, los proveedores de servicios (financieros y consultores) y los agentes políticos.
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The rationale of this paper is to offer an academic treatise of the 
topic, based on both theoretical principles and empirical trends,   
so that we can better inform the policy debate. It continues with a 
brief theoretical debate as to what governs the financing of growing 
SMEs at large, including family firm. This is followed by findings of 
empirical investigation into the financial development of UK privately 
held family companies (Poutziouris - 2001) and the financial struc-
ture and performance of UK family business PLC economy (Pou-
tziouris - 2006). It concludes with a brief discussion on certain policy 
initiatives that can stimulate the flow of long-term growth capital to 
OMFBs.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALLER OWNER-MANA-
GED FAMILY ENTERPRISES 
The morphology of the SME- family business economy is 
very heterogeneous. Smaller firms tend to be owner-mana-
ged, and whether concentration of ownership control is in 
the founder, or successive generation of family owner-ma-
nagers, the family culture overshadows strategic develop-
ment orientation. Because the family in business often plays 
a central role in the provision of entrepreneurial, human and 
financial capital, the future business growth and continuity 
plan is influenced by interwoven social and familial driven 
behavioral motives which are not always aligned with eco-
nomic rationale.  
Non-paradoxically, a minority of OMFBS are geared to de-
velop their business model and embark on growth inspired strate-
gies. 
Building on growth stage models Gersick et al. (1999), developed 
the 3 axis development model which portrays critical transition pe-
riods during the development of family enterprises, across the busi-
ness, ownership and family in business axis. While the most impor-
tant factor impacting on growth of the business across the stages of 
development is the overall market demand for its products/services, 
innovation capabilities, capacity and attitude of owner-managers 
towards strategic growth planning, the mastering of financing, go-
vernance (schemes to ensure goal alignment between active and 
passive family shareholders) and succession planning are vital for 
sustainable business success across generations. Not surprisingly, 
family business owner-managers often jeopardize their growth po-
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tential because they fail to systematically address evolving growth 
barriers on the financial, managerial, technological and marketing 
side; or they may even eschew entrepreneurial growth opportunities 
in favour of other familial driven agenda that often include indepen-
dence, oligarchic familial control, altruism, etc. 
3. FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF SMALL-MEDIUM SIZED ENTER-
PRISES - THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
It axiomatic that at the early stages of the business development, 
smaller family firms in particular, often draw social, human, finan-
cial capital from their families and friends (Sorenson and Bierman, 
2009). However, as smaller companies embark on growth they su-
ffer from a disadvantage in obtaining long-term debt and external 
equity. This may be triggered by the overlapping owner-managerial 
dynamics, business characteristics and financial market imperfec-
tions (Ang, 1991; Poutziouris et al., 1998; Matthews et al., 1994) 
When growing owner-managed family firms access external finan-
ce they tend to experience relatively more restrictive transactional 
and behavioural costs (Pettit and Singer, 1985). Owner-managers 
of family firms (agents) given their protagonistic role in running their 
firms could develop an empathy gap between them and other mino-
rity equity investors and lenders (principals). This is due to proble-
matic information asymmetries and morale hazard, which increases 
agency costs. As a result, owner-managed family firms tend to incur 
higher costs when they consider external  capital options. 
Thus, in accordance with the pecking order theorem, OMFBs tend 
to finance their capital requirements in a hierarchical fashion. First, 
using personal savings and internally generated funds, followed by 
short and long-term debt, and then finally external equity that could 
erode control (Myers, 1984;). Furthermore, a stock market flotation 
and exit option (to family and non-family) minority shareholders 
would widen the share ownership of the firm, and could lead to loss 
of control by the founding family or even a trigger a hostile take-
over.
As such, the rational response of owners-managers of smaller pri-
vate (family and non-family) companies is to avoid the use of exter-
nal equity capital  and to rely more heavily on retained profits and 
short-term bank loan finance as these respect the antithesis of the 
family to outside intrusion into their business (Gallo and Vilaseca, 
1998; Poutziouris, 2001).
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4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: HOW UK FAMILY COMPANIES FI-
NANCE THEIR DEVELOPMENT 
In empirical investigation Poutziouris et al. (1998) established that 
the financial development of private companies is influenced by the 
state of the economy, conditions in the capital markets, internal bu-
siness characteristics, and the attitudes of owner/directors towards 
financial independence, business risk and family control. Moreover, 
they reveal that OMFBs have a hierarchical preference for sourcing 
capital to finance their development.
Table 1 demonstrates the importance of retained profits as the 
overriding source of capital -- a very prudent practice. Moreover, 
the main source of external financing is bank overdraft. Evidently, 
there is an aversion towards long-term finance (both debt and risk 
equity capital); this antipathy is particularly strong in family compa-
nies. 
Table 2 extends multi-facet comparative analysis, comparing the 
funding and asset of private family firms versus non-family peers 
(columns A and B); then we can have a comparison of family con-
trolled quoted firms versus the FTSE All Shares–PLCs (columns 
C and D); This allows us to also compare the financial and asset 
structures of OMFBs, across the business life cycle as they evolve 
from smaller privately family firms into more sizeable quoted family 
firms.
Table 1. comparative Analysis of Funding structure of Private sMEs
FAMiLy cOMPAniEs nOn-FAMiLy cOMPAniEs
% OF ALL 
FunDing
% OF ExtErnAL 
FunDing
% OF ALL 
FunDing
% OF ExtErnAL 
FunDing
Retained profits 51.5 --- 42.8 ---
Bank Overdraft 17.9 52.4 15.5 37.5
Owners Equity 14.4 --- 15.7 ---
External Loans 6.2 18.2 8.5 20.4
HP / Finance leasing 4.7 13.8 10.9 26.3
Factoring 2.6 7.6 3.8 9.2
External Equity 0.8 2.3 1.3 3.1
Other 1.9 5.6 1.5 3.5
Source: Poutziouris et al (1998) The Financial Affairs of Private Companies, Tilney, Liverpool.pANIKKOS  ZATA-pOUTZIOURIS  
UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | CUARTO TRImESTRE 2011 | ISSN: 1698-5117
75
5. THE FUNDING STRUCTURE OF FAMILY VERSUS NON FA-
MILY PRIVATE COMPANIES 
Comparing the balance sheet of (353) family companies (column A) 
and (225) non-family companies (column B), a number of statistica-
lly significant differences emerge. Herewith in summary some of the 
key highlights pertinent to the funding of family companies, which 
tend to: 
Table 2. Balance sheets of Family Firms: Private versus PLcs  (%, averages), 
1995-2004
vAriABLEs
A.
PrivAtE 
FAMiLy 
FirMs
B.
OthEr 
PrivAtE 
FirMs
p
c.
FOMB PLcs
D.
FtsE ALL 
shArEs+
p
Fixed Assets
Tangible Assets 30.70 26.87 .028* 42.25 35.67 0.003*
Intangible Asset .03 .09 .001* 10.22 14.97 0.000*
Total Fixed Asset 32.56 29.41 .083 59.87 53.77 0.002*
Current Assets
Stock & WIP 20.55 17.35 .021* 10.42 12.47 0.048*
Trade Debtors 32.76 36.48 .014* 12.78 14.11 0.243
Bank and Deposit 10.0 10.77 .353 7.59 9.80 0.002*
Total Current Asset 67.63 70.97 .066 40.13 46.23 0.002*
Current Liabilities
Trade Creditors 23.07 27.63 .002* 11.43 10.64 0.389
Short term Loan 14.69 14.13 .634 5.30 5.99 0.162
Current Liabilities 52.60 60.78 .000* 31.51 33.77 0.118
Long term Liabilities
Long term Loan 10.00 13.37 .133 18.35 17.21 0.372
Other LR Liabilities 1.53 1.79 .47 5.43 5.26 0.811
Total LR Liabilities 11.53 15.16 .029* 24.84 23.10 0.239
Capital & Reserves
Issued Capital 6.0 7.0 .342 5.90 7.34 0.009*
Share Premium 1.0 3.0 .029* 10.62 26.24 0.000*
Retained Profits 26.77 15.20 .000* 5.93 2.59 0.000*
Revaluation Rerserves .04 .02 .015* 17.07 1.59 0.000*
Shareholders Funds 37.49 25.63 .000* 43.65 43.12 0.780
Note: The table offers key items of the asset base and funding structure, as % of total assets.
* t-statistic techniques: statistically different at 5% level of significance.; + excluding financial firms. ThE fINANCIAl STRUCTURE ANd pERfORmANCE Of OWNER–mANAgEd fAmIly fIRmS:
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• Invest relatively more in tangible and less in intangible assets;
• Have lower long-term liabilities (i.e. long-term bank debt, direc-
tors loans etc.) 
• Retain more profits (this over-time build a stronger equity base.
Poutziouris et al. (2000), employing analysis of covariance models, 
re-examined the association of family ownership control and balan-
ce sheet structure (controlling for size, sector and capital intensity) 
and found that OMFBs (in contrast to non-family companies) tend 
to invest less in intangible assets, to borrow less long-term funds 
and to re-invest more profits. An extension of the comparative 
analysis into performance, revealed that family companies exhibit 
weaker growth rates, in terms of sales turnover, employment and 
asset base, but tend to outperform their peers in terms of  profitabi-
lity measurements.
It is axiomatic that the majority of family-controlled ventures as they 
are not in business of fast growth and profit maximization, are more 
conservative in their strategic growth plans, and thus they tend to 
have lower gearing. This is symptomatic of their aversion towards 
sizeable term loans. However, this short-termist attitude to financing 
could lead to capital deficiencies, especially during a downturn in 
the economy, as profits diminish . 
Arguably, the sustainable development of the family company ne-
cessitates the steady flow of long-term capital, particularly when 
there is a need to finance certain strategic transitions (such as ac-
celerated growth; internationalization; transfer of ownership to suc-
cessive generations, exit of certain owners etc.). In the light of the 
above trends, it can be posited that certain groups of family compa-
nies - especially growth-oriented ventures, with a more open culture 
- appear to be bankable and could benefit from the advantages of 
venture capital as they embark on growth horizons, provided the 
private equity deals address certain restrictive aspects which are 
not compatible to their ethos e.g. control, deal structures and exit 
options.
Indeed, owner –managers of growth inspired family businesses tap   
into to long-term external capital -- private and public equity options 
-- in order to invest in new technologies and marketing strategies 
that can enable innovation based growth and development across 
frontiers. Historically, plethora of industrial and commercial fami-
lies did float their firms on the London Stock Exchange, opening 
up their ownership regimes to embrace insiders (extended relatives pANIKKOS  ZATA-pOUTZIOURIS  
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but also loyal managers) and outsiders (professional managers and 
investors) in order to strengthen both their human and financial ca-
pital base.
6. THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF FAMILY FIRMS - PRIVA-
TELY HELD VERSUS QUOTED PLCS 
In an empirical investigation into the structure and performance of 
UK Family Controlled Quoted Companies, Poutziouris (2006) provi-
ded evidence on the funding structure, growth, financial performan-
ce (profitability) and market performance (shareholders returns) of 
family controlled PLCs versus the experience of their peers. Basica-
lly, through the prism of a Family Business Index, family controlled 
PLCs  were found  to outperform the FTSE All-Share index by 40%.     
Table 2 demonstrates a series of  statistically significant differences 
in terms of the financial structure of family controlled PLCs versus 
that of their peers . In summary, OMFB –PLCs  tend to:  
• Invest more in tangible assets –regarded as symbol of financial 
autonomy – and can be used as collateral for loans.
• Use more long-term loans – perhaps because they can secure 
better deals, and more importantly they can refrain from issuing 
more equity, at the cost of family control.
•  In  line  with  pecking order principles, family controlled PLCs 
tend to issue relatively lower share capital, including additional 
rounds; and of course are more prudent with profits – as they 
enthusiastically re-invest it.
Following an extension of the comparative analysis into the per-
formance, it emerged that family controlled PLCs, tend to be more 
profitable, grow slower and have lower gearing levels. 
7. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY IN SHAPING PER-
FORMANCE?
Scholars have been arguing that family firms possess certain dy-
namic capabilities, value-adding familiness and access to idiosyn-
cratic social capital advantages which fuel their competitive advan-
tage. The competitive edge of family controlled companies is more 
evident when the economy and capital markets under perform and 
is relatively suppressed when market conditions are buoyant. Stein 
(1988) demonstrated that quoted companies shareholders charac-
terized with longer investment horizons suffer less from managerial 
myopia and opportunism, as they are less likely to forego good in-ThE fINANCIAl STRUCTURE ANd pERfORmANCE Of OWNER–mANAgEd fAmIly fIRmS:
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vestments for the sake of boosting short-term profits. James (1999) 
argued that family firms, because of family commitment to perpe-
tuating ownership onto succeeding generations, provide inherent 
incentives to invest more efficiently and prudently according to the 
market rules. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), found that one 
implication of families maintaining a long-term presence in family 
firms is that the firm will enjoy certain economies, such as a lower 
cost of debt financing. 
8. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES FEATURING 
THE FAMILY BUSINESS PLC MODEL  
Poutziouris (2006) in the report, The UK Family Business PLC 
Economy, offers evidence from cross case studies featuring the fo-
llowing success stories: Associated  British Foods PLC - the global 
food masters; Caledonia Investments PLC - the long-term investors 
in growth; Huntleigh Technology PLC - the innovators; and Town 
Centre Securities - the builders of value 
The interview based case study research revealed that quoted 
firms with dominant owning families on board were characterized 
with effective mechanism to address agency costs, were endowed 
with RBV-based familiness (enduring trust based relations and so-
cial capital) (Habbershon, T., Williams, M., 1999), paradigmatic ele-
ments of stewardship, financial prudence, devotion and long-term 
commitment. Quoted family firms have evolved their own approach 
to master their long-term development, to align goals of owners and 
managers, to build relationships with financial agents, to mitigate 
risk and to chart effective strategic decision-making. 
More recently, Poutziouris and Savva (2011) using a panel dataset 
from 1998 to 2008, evaluated the relation between founding-family 
ownership and firm performance controlling for a number of exter-
nal to the firm conditions and business characteristics. They report   
that family involvement is associated with superior accounting per-
formance and inferior market performance – based on Tobin’s Q ra-
tio. Once non-linearities are included in the model, the performance 
of family firms using Tobin’s Q is in line with the results of accoun-
ting performance measures. Moreover, they identify the inflection 
point where the positive association of family ownership and perfor-
mance tapers off; it is 31% when using profitability measurements, 
and  42% when using Tobin’s Q. Their results mirrors US findings 
where quoted family firms (with founding families playing an active pANIKKOS  ZATA-pOUTZIOURIS  
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role in ownership and management control) exhibited superior-per-
formance than their Standard & Poors counterparts (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). 
According to Table 2 (see columns A and C), quoted family firms 
are better capitalized than their private family firms and have better 
access to debt , asset based finance  and equity options, which can 
enable them to grow internally (new product/market development) 
and externally (via mergers and acquisitions). Of course, a priori 
condition, is that they have to comply with rules and regulations and 
are eager to develop their governance culture to embrace corporate 
professionals with recruitment and retention rewards schemes, and 
thus use their management talent to strategically plan for growth. 
Despite the resilience and superior performance of UK of family 
controlled quoted companies, evidence suggests that there is a 
diminishing role for the family ownership in the UK (Franks et al., 
2003; Faccio and Lang, 2001). Over time, with smaller stakehol-
ding, rising hostile takeovers, demanding institutional shareholders, 
increased capital market regulation and takeover reforms, families 
found it very challenging to sustain control. Arguably, the increasing 
regulation and protection to minority shareholders perhaps made 
owning families comfortable to liquidate their holdings. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The financial development of OMFBs is overshadowed by the ‘keep 
it in the family’ tradition and thus exhibit adherence to the pecking 
order philosophy. Even growth inspired firms that are suitable for 
private equity are often not so enthusiastic to part with outsiders 
(Poutziouris, 2001). The key sources of funding for privately held 
family controlled firms are internally generated equity (i.e. share ca-
pital plus retained profits) and short-term loans. 
Owner-managers of growing family firms could orchestrate partner-
ships with loyal talented management, develop goal alignment and 
ensure valuable resource – dynamic capabilities and idiosyncratic 
knowledge that enable winning strategies. Therefore, certain growth 
inspired and well established family companies could represent a 
less risky investment for family business - friendly private equity 
providers offering “Heritage and Harvest Capital Solutions”.
Evidence from the UK, and other market economies, demonstrate 
that family controlled quoted companies, under certain conditions, ThE fINANCIAl STRUCTURE ANd pERfORmANCE Of OWNER–mANAgEd fAmIly fIRmS:
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despite their relatively more conservative approach to financing, are 
credited with superior performance. The family business PLC model 
works, as family ownership and involvement, does address agency 
costs, and thus safeguards unique dynamic capabilities and ties to   
build enduring business models .
Policy Affairs
•  Family Business Owner-Manager Directors ought to strategi-
cally plan for development across family-business-ownership 
axis and thus master the Visscher dilemma: balance business 
growth capital requirements with family control catering for li-
quidity events for retiring /exiting family shareholders. In the 
context of enhanced capital requirements to finance market 
imposed fast growth activities and other concurrent family in 
business transitions (e.g. succession), external equity (private 
or public) could prove to be indispensable to the sustainable 
growth of the business. 
• Financiers ought to receive more training about the critical is-
sues (market-based and familial) confronting the survival and 
long-term trans-generational growth of the family businesses 
and business families.
• Policy Makers: In line with the principles of pecking order, there 
is scope for more tax-based schemes offering  an allowance 
for corporate equity - ACE. This will ensure that re-investment 
of profits receives the same tax treatment as interest paid to 
lenders; it will  also incentivize the issue of new share capital.  pANIKKOS  ZATA-pOUTZIOURIS  
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